Meta-Epistemology

There is ethics, and then there is metaethics. While that philosophical distinction is hard to make precise, most of us find it a useful one. An analogous distinction might lead us to a natural class of problems falling under the heading of “metaepistemology”. This course will try to identify and explore problems under that heading.

Grading:
There are two ways to receive a grade for this course. (A) You may submit two papers, roughly in the 10 - 15 page range. One of these papers may be, and is encouraged to be, a revision of the other one. (B) You may submit one longer paper, roughly in the 20 - 25 page range. Before preparing any paper, a brief topic proposal, about a paragraph, must be approved.

Office Hrs: officially 3:30pm Wednesdays, but also anytime by appt.

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Schedule/Reading List
My tentative plan is for us to work through the following material, with the pieces in bold serving as lynchpins for our discussion. Pace, and deviations from the list below, can be set with input from those regularly attending the class. Electronic copies of all readings will be made available.

Topic: Logic and Rationality
• Gilbert Harman, chs. 1 and 2, appendix
• John MacFarlane, “In What Sense (If Any) Is Logic Normative for Thought?”
• Paul Boghossian & Gideon Rosen “Logic and Reasoning (Reply to MacFarlane)”
• Hartry Field, “What Is the Normative Role of Logic?”
• Mark Sainsbury, “Which Logic Should We Think With?”
• Niko Kolodny, “How Does Coherence Matter?”

Topic: The Problem of Logical Omniscience
• David Christensen, Chapter 6 of Putting Logic in its Place
• Ian Hacking, “Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability”
• Christensen, “Does Murphy’s Law Apply in Epistemology?”
• Robert Stalnaker, Chapter 5 of Inquiry
• Stalnaker, “The Problem of Logical Omniscience (I)”
Topic: The Meaning-Based Approach to Epistemology

- Christopher Peacocke, “How Are A Priori Truths Possible?”
- Paul Boghossian, “Blind Reasoning”
- Ralph Wedgwood, “Primitively Rational Belief-Forming Practices”
- Timothy Williamson, Chapter 4 of The Philosophy of Philosophy
- Boghossian, “Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic
- Paul Horwich, “Ungrounded Reason”

Topic: Rationality and Rule-Following

- Crispin Wright, “Rule Following Without Reasons”
- Paul Boghossian, “Epistemic Rules”

Topic: The Metaphysics of Rationality

- Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized”
- Kim, “What is ‘Naturalized Epistemology’?”
- Allan Gibbard, selections from Wise Choices, Apt Feelings and Thinking How to Live
- Hartry Field, “Epistemology without Metaphysics”
- Sinan Dogramaci, “Deflationary Epistemology”

Topic: How Are Rational Beliefs Related to the Truth?

- Marian David, “Truth as the Epistemic Goal”
- Nozick, chapter 5 of The Nature of Rationality
- Thomas Kelly, “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique”
- David Velleman, “On the Aim of Belief”
- Nishi Shah, “How Truth Governs Belief”
- Shah and Velleman, “Doxastic Deliberation”

Topic: Intuitions and the Truth-Connection

- Richard Foley, selections from Intellectual Trust in Ourselves and Others
- Karl Schafer, “Enlightenment Epistemology and Self-Trust”
- Roger White, “Epistemic Subjectivism”
- Michael Huemer, “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism”
- Sinan Dogramaci, “Intuitions for Inferences”
- Jonathan Weinberg, “How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Skepticism”
- Paul Benacerraf, “Mathematical Truth”
- Hartry Field, “Recent Debates about the A Priori”
Topic: Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence
• Adam Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement”
• Thomas Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence”
• Brian Weatherson, “Disagreeing about Disagreement”
• Roger White, “Epistemic Permissiveness”
• Andy Egan and Adam Elga, “I Can’t Believe I’m Stupid”
• David Christensen, “Higher-Order Evidence”

Topic: Reasons vs. Rational Requirements
• John Broome, “Normative Requirements”
• Niko Kolodny, “Why Be Rational?”
• Broome, “Does Rationality Give us Reasons?”
• Karl Schafer, “Reasons and Rational Requirements, Objective and Subjective”